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REPLY 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
D'Oro v. D'Oro, 454 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1982), aff'd, 474 A.2d 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), 
remains good law in the state of New Jersey. Although Innes v. 
Innes, 542 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), 
"disagreed" with D'Oro, D'Oro was not overruled. The Appellate 
Division panel that decided Innes had no power to overrule or 
disapprove D'Oro because D'Oro was decided by an appellate 
panel of equal authority to the Innes panel. 
There is a split of authority on the issue of whether 
retirement benefits can be treated as income to the recipient 
for purposes of determining alimony to be paid to the other 
spouse. The majority rule is that retirement benefits cannot 
be treated as income to the recipient for purposes of 
determining alimony. Utah Supreme Court authority suggests 
that Utah follows the majority rule. 
ARGUMENT 
I. D'ORO IS GOOD LAW 
Respondent ("Dr. Millikan") raises as his sole issue 
on Cross-Appeal the trial court's error in awarding Appellant 
("Mrs. Millikan") alimony based on Dr. Millikan's share of 
retirement benefits, which retirement benefits were divided 
between the parties pursuant to their irrevocable joint 
election. In support of his position, Dr. Millikan cites in 
his Brief Utah case law and cases from other states, including 
the New Jersey case of D'Oro v. D'Oro, 454 A.2d 915 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch« Div. 1982), aff8d, 474 A.2d 1070 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. DiVc 1984). 
The issue decided in D'Oro was whether retirement 
payments to a working spouse, who had been previously ordered 
to pay alimony, should be considered as income to the working 
spouse for purposes of determining alimony. The holding of the 
court, affirmed on appeal, was that retirement benefits could 
not be considered as income to the working spouse. 
Mrs. Millikan cites in her Reply Brief Innes v. Innes, 
542 A.2d 39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), which "disagreed" 
with D'Oro. Mrs. Millikan incorrectly characterizes Innes as 
"disapproving" D'Oro. The Appellate Division panel deciding 
Innes had no power to overrule or disapprove D'Oro. A 
discussion of the New Jersey Superior Court system is necessary 
to understand the impact of Innes on D'Oro. 
The New Jersey Superior Court system is divided into 
three sections. There are two trial court sections known as 
Chancery and Law. The other section is the Appellate 
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Division. The Appellate Division has twenty-eight judges who 
sit in seven panels of four judges (known as "parts"). Each 
part has co-equal power and cannot overrule another part or 
"disapprove" the decision of another part. Thus, it is 
possible in New Jersey to have inconsistent, yet valid case 
law. Presumably, conflicts between parts are ultimately 
resolved by appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the highest 
court of appeals, which has not ruled on this issue. 
It follows from this understanding of the New Jersey 
Superior Court system that Innes had no legal impact on D'Oro. 
The Innes court part obviously disagreed with D'Oro, but did 
not overrule or disapprove D'Oro. Therefore, D'Oro remains 
good law in New Jersey. 
II. MOST COURTS THAT HAVE CONSIDERED THE ISSUE DO NOT TREAT 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING 
ALIMONY 
Of the several states that have expressly considered 
the issue raised on Cross-Appeal, most have held that 
retirement benefits cannot be treated as income to the 
recipient for purposes of determining alimony to be paid to the 
other spouse. This is the rule in Minnesota, Kruschel v. 
Kruschel, 419 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), Wisconsin, 
Pelot v. Pelot, 342 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), and, as 
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noted above, in New Jersey. Apparently, the only case reaching 
a different result is the New Jersey case of Innes, discussed 
above. 
Mrs. Millikan, in anticipation of Dr. Millikan's Brief 
on Cross-Appeal, cited Innes, Lang v. Lang, 425 N.W.2d 800 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988), In re Marriage of Baker, 251 Cal. Rptr. 
126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), and In re Marriage of White, 237 Cal. 
Rptr. 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), in opposition to the 
Cross-Appeal. 
Baker has absolutely nothing to do with the issue on 
Cross-Appeal and appears to be an erroneous citation. White, 
as noted at pages 63-64 of Dr. Millikan's Brief, actually 
supports this Cross-Appeal, pointing out that double counting 
of retirement benefits does occur when the non-working spouse 
is awarded (or contractually entitled to receive) a portion of 
the working spouse's retirement benefits. Lang is 
distinguishable on the basis that there were no facts before 
the Lang court indicating that the working spouse's retirement 
benefits would be lower, as a result of the non-working 
spouse's beneficiary interest in the retirement plan. This 
fact also distinguishes Innes. 
Thus, from a review of cases located by the parties, 
it appears that four states, Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Jersey, 
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and California, support the position asserted by Dr. Millikan 
on Cross-Appeal. Only one state, New Jersey, has taken a 
contrary view. 
III. UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF THE MAJORITY RULE 
In its pronouncements in the case of Dogu v. Dogu, 652 
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court gives guidance to 
how it would rule on the issue raised on Cross-Appeal. On 
remand to the district court, the Dogu court suggested several 
methods the trial court could use to distribute retirement 
benefits: 
(1) The court could order that respondent 
elect a joint and survivor annuity under 
each retirement fund where that is an 
option, with appropriate adjustment to his 
alimony obligation during the period 
following retirement. (2) If respondent's 
retirement rights permit this option, the 
court could order that respondent elect that 
upon his retirement appellant be paid, in 
lieu of alimony after retirement, a lump sum 
equal to one-half the value of the 
retirement benefit as of the date of 
divorce, plus investment income accumulated 
thereafter. (3) The court might order that 
appellants's rights to alimony continue 
after respondent's death (until her own 
death or remarriage). 
Id. at 1311 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has already set forth the 
various permissible treatments of retirement benefits. Under 
the first method of distribution in Doqu, the district court 
can order retirement benefits split between the parties by 
providing survivor payments to the non-working spouse. If this 
method is invoked, the income from retirement benefits is 
"adjusted" out of the alimony obligation, because the 
non-working spouse is provided for under the working spouse's 
retirement plan. This is the result which should be applied 
here. Under the second distribution method, retirement 
benefits can be paid in a lump sum when such benefits are 
payable from the retirement plan, assuming the plan provides 
for lump-sum distribution. In that case, also, the non-working 
spouse will receive no alimony based on the working spouse's 
retirement income. Finally, the trial court could allow the 
working spouse to retain one hundred percent of his or her 
retirement benefits, and consider the benefits as "income" from 
which alimony is paid. 
The Utah Supreme Court's first recommended approach 
should be applied in the case at bar because Mrs. Millikan is 
entitled to one hundred percent survivorship rights under 
Dr. Millikan's retirement plans. Dr. and Mrs. Millikan jointly 
and irrevocably chose retirement options that maximized 
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survivorship benefits to Mrs. Millikan and reduced retirement 
benefits payable to Dr. Millikan during his life. 
The trial court in this case acknowledged 
Mrs. Millikan's irrevocable right to share in Dr. Millikan's 
retirement benefits and, in fact, recognized that Mrs. Millikan 
would receive more from Dr. Millikan's retirement than 
Dr. Millikan. Yet, Dr. Millikan was required by the trial 
court to pay alimony to Mrs. Millikan based on Dr. Millikan's 
share of his retirement benefits. This amounts to double 
payment to Mrs. Millikan of the retirement benefits. Nowhere 
in Doqu does the Supreme Court allow for an alternative that 
splits retirement benefits between the parties and also 
entitles the non-working spouse to alimony based on the working 
spouse's share of retirement benefits. 
IV. IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO TREAT RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS 
BOTH MARITAL PROPERTY AND INCOME 
Most states grant to their trial courts discretion to 
consider vested retirement benefits in making property division 
or alimony awards. In some cases, the marital estate is 
sizable and the trial court is able to off-set with property of 
the marital estate an award to the working spouse of all of his 
or her retirement benefits. More often, however, the marital 
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estate will not bear such an off-set award and the working 
spouse will be required to pay alimony in lieu of division of 
the retirement benefits* 
In the latter case, upon retirement of the working 
spouse, courts may require the spouse receiving retirement 
benefits to continue paying alimony from retirement benefits. 
Where the non-working spouse has received no portion of the 
retirement benefits in the divorce, this is not an unfair 
result. 
Where, however, the non-working spouse is entitled to 
directly receive a share of the working spouse's retirement 
benefits, it is unfair to treat retirement benefits as income 
and impose on the working spouse the burden of alimony. As 
noted by the Kruschel court, "pension [payments] should be 
viewed as property or income, but not both." 419 N.W.2d. at 
122 (emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
Nearly all courts that have considered the issue on 
Cross-Appeal have held that retirement benefits split between 
parties to a divorce cannot be counted as income when paid to 
the working spouse to then be paid out as alimony to the 
non-working spouse. The Utah Supreme Court in Docru clearly 
prohibits this sort of double-counting of retirement benefits. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ "^ day of June, 1989. 
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Jan C. Graham 
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